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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, Nancy Knorr caused an accident by turning her car into
oncoming traffic. 1 At the time of the accident, Ms. Knorr "believed she was
the object of a conspiracy."'2 She had a delusional disorder, experiencing
specifically delusions of persecution, which can be terrifying.3 Ms. Knorr
was aware that she had a mental illness, but her symptoms had been in
remission for seven years prior to the accident. 4 In addition, an expert
witness testified that "people with delusional beliefs almost never believe
something is wrong with them.... Knorr's delusional beliefs that caused her
to panic were 'relatively sudden.' 5 Although Ms. Knorr's beliefs were
symptoms of her illness, the court did not consider that illness a defense. The
plaintiff was granted a directed verdict, and the jury awarded a half-million-
dollar verdict. 6
Approximately 2.4 million American adults, or about 1.1 percent of the
population age 18 and older, have schizophrenia. 7 People with schizophrenia
often have difficulty performing tasks of daily living in the face of
debilitating hallucinations, delusions, and disorganized thinking. 8 Although
breakthroughs in science have produced helpful medication, such medication
is not completely effective. 9 People with schizophrenia and other severe
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1 Ramey v. Knorr, 124 P.3d 314, 316 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
2 Id.
3 DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS-TExT REVISION
299 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV]; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH,
SCHIZOPHRENIA (2006), http://www. nimh.nih.gov/publicat/schizoph.cfm#symptoms.
4 Ramey, 124 P.3d at 319-20.
5 Id. at 320.
6 Id. at 317.
7 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE NUMBERS COUNT: MENTAL
DISORDERS IN AMERICA (2006), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/numbers.cfm.
8 DSM-IV, supra note 3, at 299-300; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH,
SCHIZOPHRENIA (2006), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/schizoph.cfm#definition.
9 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 8.
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mental illnesses must not only cope with their disability, but also bear the
brunt of financial liability for symptoms of a disease that they cannot
control. 10
In 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in The Common Law "if insanity
of a pronounced type exists, manifestly incapacitating the sufferer from
complying with the rule which he has broken, good sense would require it to
be admitted as an excuse."" l One hundred twenty-six years later, the
common law system has yet to progress to the modem understanding of
mental illness and fairness that Holmes set forth. Instead, the common law
still requires defendants in negligence actions to meet an objective
"reasonable person" standard to avoid liability, even if the defendant is
severely mentally ill.' 2
There has been an ongoing disagreement between legal scholars and the
courts regarding whether mentally ill defendants should be held liable for
their actions since Holmes' proclamation in 1881.13 The common law rule
that an objective standard of liability applies to actors with mental disabilities
is well settled and stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.14 Although
courts have cited a number of reasons for maintaining the status quo and
requiring an objective standard for mentally ill defendants, each of those
reasons has been addressed and refuted by treatises and journal articles. 15
Perhaps because the courts have been so consistent in their basic requirement
that mentally ill defendants use the same "reasonable" care as other people,
the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts has continued to perpetuate an
objective standard for those with mental illness that is inconsistent with our
current fault-based system of torts. 16
10 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, 176-
78 (W. Page Keeton ed., 1984).
11 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 109 (1881).
12 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 32, at 176-78.
13 Compare James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97 (1908),
Robert M. Ague, The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions, 60 DICK. L. REv. 211
(1955), and David E. Seideison, Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in
Negligence Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 17 (1981), with Hudnall v. Sellner, 800 F.2d 377 (4th Cir. 1986),
Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1960), Young v. Young, 132 S.W. 155 (Ky.
1910), and Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581 (1870).
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965) ("Unless the actor is a child, his
insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for conduct
which does not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under like circumstances.").
15 See infra Part IV.
16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 1(c)
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("An actor's mental or emotional disability is not
considered in determining whether conduct is negligent ... ").
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The new proposed Restatement is similar in rule to, but different in
rationale from, the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Although the language is
slightly different, the effect of the rule is exactly the same. 17 Interestingly,
the new draft Restatement has done away with the standard reasons for
requiring an objective standard for mentally ill actors.18 Instead, the authors
of the proposed Restatement argue that because of the deinstitutionalization
movement, the public needs to be protected from people with mental
illness. 19 They further suggest that "there can be doubts as to whether the
[mentally ill] person should be allowed to engage in the normal range of
society's activities. ' 20 At the very least, say the Restatement authors, the
purpose of requiring compensation from a mentally ill defendant is to protect
the interests of the public from the inevitable injury that will result from the
actor's "substandard conduct." 21
This recasting of an old rule with new policy considerations does not
effectively ameliorate the paradox of imposing liability on an actor for
actions caused by an illness, rather than free will, in a fault-based tort system.
Indeed, the proposed Restatement continues to support the rule that people
with physical disabilities are held to a subjective reasonable person standard,
based on the capacity of persons with that disability.22 By effectively
requiring a strict liability standard for defendants who have a mental (as
opposed to a physical) illness precluding fault, the common law and the
Restatement are perpetuating stereotypes and misunderstanding about the
mentally ill population. To be consistent and fair, mentally ill defendants
17 Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965). The second Restatement
states "his insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability"
rather than "mental or emotional disability is not considered" in the proposed third
Restatement. In either case, mental illness, even if considered, is not an excuse or
justification that would defend the actor against liability.
18 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 11 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
19 Id. Deinstitutionalization is "the policy of moving severely mentally ill people out
of large state institutions and then closing part or all of those institutions .... In 1955,
there were 558,239 severely mentally ill patients in the nation's public psychiatric
hospitals. In 1994, this number had been reduced by 486,620 patients, to 71,619." E.
FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S MENTAL ILLNESS
CRISIS 8 (1997).
20 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 11 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
21 Id.
22 Id. at § 10-11 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("A child's conduct is negligent
if it does not conform to that of a reasonably careful person of the same age, intelligence,
and experience .... The conduct of an actor with physical disability is negligent only if it
does not conform to that of a reasonably careful person with the same disability.").
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should have a subjective standard for determining liability that is consistent
with their particular disability, just as a subjective standard is available for-
defendants with physical disabilities.
This Note will discuss the meaning of mental illness in the legal context
in Part II. Part III will discuss the development of the objective reasonable
person standard with which negligence liability is currently determined, as
well as exceptions to that rule, and how children and those with physical
disabilities are provided a subjective standard of liability. Part IW will lay out
the purposes of modem tort law and how they are inconsistent with policies
for continuing to hold mentally ill defendants liable for situations that they
cannot control. In addition, Part V will refute the rationale in the proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts for continuing to require mentally ill people to
provide compensation regardless of fault. Finally, Part VI proposes a
subjective standard that will address the concerns of the courts as well as
provide a test for liability of mentally ill defendants that is more consistent
with the fault-based tort system.
II. DEFINING MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE LAW
Mental illness, or mental disorder, generally encompasses a broad range
of illnesses and conditions. 23 However, in the law, mental illness and "mental
capacity" mean something very specific based on the context. There are a
range of standards for mental disorder in the areas of contract, probate, health
care, and divorce law, which are defined by various determinations of the
actor's ability to understand his actions.24 In addition, there is a statutory
23 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-Fourth Edition defines mental disorder
as a "clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in
an individual and that is associated with present distress... or disability (i.e., impairment
in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of
suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom." DSM-IV, supra note 3,
at xxxi. The categories recognized within this broad definition are substance-related
disorders, psychotic disorders (such as schizophrenia), mood disorders (such as
depression and bipolar disorder), anxiety disorders, eating disorders, sleep disorders,
personality disorders, and others. Id.
24 Harry J.F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 LAw &
PSYCHOL. REv. 1, 35 (1995). In contract law, the "lack of mental capacity sufficient to
execute a deed" is defined as a lack of "'sufficient consciousness or mentality ... to
understand the import of [his or] her acts' when the deed was executed." Daughton v.
Parson, 423 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted). In probate law, the
standard for sufficient mental capacity is weaker than in contract law. In Burns v.
Marshall, 767 So. 2d 347, 353 (Ala. 2000), the court defined "testamentary capacity" as:
mind and memory sufficient to recall and remember the property she [is] about to
bequeath, and the objects of her bounty, and the disposition which she [wishes] to
make-to know and understand the nature and consequences of the business to be
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definition for disability, which includes mental disability, in the context of
the Americans with Disabilities Act.25 The definition of mental disability
revolves around the effect on the actor's daily life rather than mental
capacity, which is based on his understanding of his actions.
The most common, and likely the most discussed, legal standard for
mental illness is "insanity" in the context of criminal law. There are two
general kinds of tests used to measure insanity for purposes of criminal
defense-cognitive and impulse control.26 The most common cognitive test
is the M'Naghten Rule, based on an 1843 British case, which states that a
defendant is insane if he did not "know the nature and quality of [his] act,"
or, if he did know, "he did not know he was doing what was wrong."'27 On
the other hand, the "irresistible impulse" test does not depend on
understanding right from wrong; rather, the question is whether or not the
actor was able to control his actions. 28
For the purposes of this Note, and in considering a legal standard for
liability, the term "mental illness" will refer to those diseases that include
significant cognitive impairment, including delusions and hallucinations. The
analysis of tort law and its reaction to individuals with mental illness will be
in the context of an actor's inability to distinguish between fact and thoughts
and sensations caused by the actor's illness. An appropriate test for
measuring liability based on mental illness is proposed in Part VI.
performed, and to discern the simple and obvious relation of its elements to each
other.
Id. For purposes of tolling a statute of limitations period, "'insanity' ... is any mental
condition which precludes the plaintiff's understanding the nature or effects of his acts
and thus prevents him from comprehending his legal rights." Pederson v..Time, Inc., 532
N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (Mass. 1989) (citations omitted).
25 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) ("The term
'disability' means, with respect to an individual--(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.").
26 Richard E. Redding, The Brain Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal
Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 51, 80-85 (2006).
27 M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L.).
28 Redding, supra note 26, at 81-82. Jurisdictions are split regarding the definition
of insanity used in criminal defense, if it is allowed as a defense at all. Most jurisdictions
use a cognitive test for insanity. Eighteen states and the District of Columbia incorporate
a control test in their insanity standards, and five states have eliminated the insanity
defense in their jurisdiction. Id.
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III. NEGLIGENCE AND THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
The legal definition of negligence is "not exercis[ing] reasonable care
under all the circumstances. ' 29 To further determine what "reasonable care"
is, the fact finder in a negligence action is charged with determining what a
"reasonable man of ordinary prudence," or reasonable person, would do in
that situation.30 The reasonable person is an ideal of a model citizen, but will
have shortcomings as determined appropriate by the fact finder. 31
However, the reasonable person may act differently in different
situations. The fact finder must determine what a reasonable person would do
"under the same or similar circumstances" as the defendant. 32 Although the
reasonable person standard of conduct is clearly determined by taking
account of the facts of each situation, the reasonable person standard is,
minus narrow exceptions, an objective standard in regards to the actor.33 The
idiosyncrasies of individuals are not taken into account when determining
whether an actor is liable for damages. For example, a defendant who is
clumsy cannot use such clumsiness as a defense.34 If defendants were able to
use their individual characteristics or shortcomings, there would be unlimited
defenses for tort actions because every defendant could show some
clumsiness, or slightly lower intelligence, or lesser ability to pay attention,
than others. As a result, people injured by others' negligence would have no
protection. For these reasons, the reasonable person must be at some level an
objective standard.
29 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
30 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 32, at 174 (citing Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837)
132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.).
31 KEETON ETAL., supra note 10, § 32, at 175.
32 Id. (citation omitted). See also Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 835 A.2d 616,
624 (Md. 2003); Foulke v. Beogher, 850 N.E.2d 1269, 1273 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); Herr
v. Wheeler, 634 S.E.2d 317, 320 (Va. 2006).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965) ("The [reasonable person]
standard ... must be an objective and external one, rather than that of the individual
judgment, good or bad, of the particular individual.... [The standard] affords a formula
by which, so far as possible, a uniform standard may be maintained."). But see Warren F.
Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: Defining the Reasonable
Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78
GEO. L.J. 241, 241 (1989) (stating that courts have not decided whether the reasonable
person standard is objective or subjective).
34 See HOLMES, supra note 11, at 108.
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A. Development of Rules of Negligence
Historically, the tort system existed to compensate plaintiffs for their
loss, not necessarily to serve justice. The primary purpose of tort law was to
avoid the problem of those injured taking justice into their own hands.35 If
the plaintiff was injured, he would be compensated, regardless of whether the
defendant was morally culpable.36 This system of strict liability was used not
only to avoid what might otherwise be a violent method of dispute resolution,
but also for administrative reasons. The common law courts believed that the
state of mind of a person could not be ascertained. 37 Matters of intent did not
enter into liability disputes; the process was entirely objective. 38 As a result,
the original purpose of tort law was purely compensation for injury.
The common law strict liability rule that mentally ill people should be
subject to the same liability as others was born within this historical context
of strict liability. No defense, including mental illness, infancy, physical
disability, and self-defense, was available in the original common law writ
system. 39 However, as the writ system fell and a broad theory for tort actions
was being developed, scholars and courts began to carve out exceptions to
the harsh strict liability standard for negligence actions.
35 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 4, at 21 ("[T]he law doth not so much regard the
intent of the actor, as the loss and damage of the party suffering.") (quoting Lambert v.
Bessey, (1681) 83 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B.); HOLMES, supra note 11, at 2-4.
36 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 4, at 21; G. EDWARD WRITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 12-14 (expanded ed. 2003) ("The crucial inquiry
in tort actions prior to the 1870s was not whether a defendant was 'in fault' or had
otherwise violated some comprehensive standard of tort liability, but whether something
about the circumstances of the plaintiffs injury compelled the defendant to pay the
plaintiff damages.").
37 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 4, at 23-24.
38 Id. at 24; David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early
Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REv. 59, 83 n.148 (1996).
39 Seipp, supra note 38, at 83 n.148 ("Neither prosecutions for felony nor writs of
trespass allowed defendants to plead accident-i.e., lack of intent, mens rea, negligence,
or fault-as a special defense."); Patrick Kelley, Infancy, Insanity, and Infirmity in the
Law of Torts, 48 AM. J. JuRis. 179, 181 (2003). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 10,
§ 4, at 21. However, this rule of complete strict liability only applied to negligence causes
of action; like today, if intent were an element of the tort, the child or mentally ill
individual would not be liable if he was not able to form such intent. Kelley, supra, at
185.
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B. Exception for Children
In the late 1800s, as the standards for negligence began to develop, the
issue of the liability of children began to shift.40 At the same time, the focus
on compensation as the sole purpose of the tort system began to give way to
morality or fault as an important factor in determining liability.41 Because
courts found that children had a different capacity for morality, they slowly
changed -the reasonable person standard by first addressing how contributory
negligence was determined for plaintiff children. The new standard of
liability for contributory negligence included the fact of a plaintiffs age.42
Although children were now held to a different standard than adult plaintiffs,
the standard varied from court to court; most had some formula that included
consideration of the child's age, capacity, and/or experience.43 However,
although there was a new standard for contributory negligence, negligence of
child defendants was still determined by the same standard of liability as
adults.44
In 1911, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Briese v. Maechtle first used
the subjective standard of liability for a child defendant.45 The plaintiff was
injured by the defendant while he was playing a game of tag during recess in
a schoolyard.46 The court felt strongly that it was an injustice to find a child
liable for an injury caused through play and affirmed the lower court's grant
of nonsuit for the defendant. 47 The case was decided based on precedent that
used the subjective standard of liability for children in the context of
contributory negligence.48 In addition, the court emphasized a strong policy
argument: suits based on accidents in the playground would have a chilling
effect on the necessary exercise and fun of children playing.49 Through its
policy argument, the court acknowledged that society does -not expect, or
even want, children to be held financially liable for acting like children.
40 Kelley, supra note 39, at 189.
41 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 4, at 22 ("Toward the close of the nineteenth
century this tendency [to ignore moral innocence] was so marked, that efforts were made
by noted writers to construct a consistent theory of tort law upon the basic principle that
there should be no liability without 'fault'...
42 Kelley, supra note 39, at 189.
43 Id. at 190.
44 Id. at 191.
45 130 N.W. 893, 893 (Wis. 1911).
4 6 
Id.
4 7 Id. at 894.
48 Id. (citing Anderson v. Chicago Brass Co., 106 N.W. 1077 (Wis. 1906)).
49 Briese, 130 N.W. at 893.
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Finally, in 1934 the Restatement (First) of Torts stated what is now the
standard for the liability of children: "the standard behavior to be expected
from a child of like age, intelligence and experience," applicable to both
negligence and contributory negligence. 50 This standard is -extremely
subjective; two children of the same age may be held to different standards
based on their intelligence. 51
Many jurisdictions place age limits below which negligence cannot be
found. In a plurality of jurisdictions, negligence cannot be found in children
seven years old or younger; however, there is little agreement between states
as to what exactly the age limit for liability should be. 52 In addition, some
states provide an older limit below which there is a rebuttable presumption
that the child is not liable.53
Finally, in a majority of jurisdictions, a child defendant is held to an
adult standard when he engages in a dangerous activity usually reserved for
adults. 54 This exception to the subjective child standard indicates that society
still values compensation and freedom from danger, and that children should
have a disincentive from engaging in particularly dangerous activities.
C. Exception for Persons with Physical Disabilities
Like the standard for children, defendants with physical disabilities were
historically held to the same standard as the non-disabled reasonable
50 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. e (1934).
51 Morse v. Goduti, 777 A.2d 292, 295 (N.H. 2001) (finding that contributory
negligence of 10-year-old was determined taking into account his developmental
disabilities). See also Carrillo v. Kreckel, 352 N.Y.S.2d 730, 734 (App. Div. 1974)
("[I]nfants must abstain from negligent acts and thereby exercise the degree of care to
which children of their age, experience, intelligence and ability are capable."); First Nat'l
Bank of Ariz. v. Dupree, 665 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Hoyt v. Rosenberg,
182 P.2d 234 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
52 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 32, at 180; Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 662
(Ind. 2000) ("[C]hildren under the age of 7 years are conclusively presumed to be
incapable of being contributorily negligent, from 7 to 14 [years] a rebuttable presumption
exists they may be guilty thereof, and over 14, absent special circumstances, they are
chargeable with exercising the standard care of an adult.") (quotation omitted).
53 KEETON ETAL., supra note 10, § 32, at 180.
54 Id. § 32, at 181 ("[W]henever a child ... engages in an activity which is normally
one for adults only ... the child must be held to the adult standard .... "). See also
Wollaston v. Burlington Northern Inc., 612 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Mont. 1980) ("We hold that
a youth driving an automobile is held to the same standard of care as an adult .. ");
Gunnells v. Dethrage, 366 So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Ala. 1979); Betzold v. Erickson, 182
N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962).
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person.55 However, there was always a subjective standard for disabled
plaintiffs when determining contributory negligence.56 Similar to the
evolution of the liability standard for children, courts provided a defense in
the context of contributory negligence before allowing the physical
disabilities of a defendant to impact his standard for negligence.57
The current state of the law provides a caveat to the reasonable person
standard-that a person with a physical disability is held to the standard of a
reasonable person with that same disability.58 A more objective standard than
that for children, the standard for adults with physical disabilities does not
take into account the intelligence of the individual, but still provides that the
actor's physical characteristics be included in the circumstances surrounding
the situation. Tort law does not require those with physical impairments to
perform the impossible and act as if they are able-bodied. 59
This standard is both more lenient and in some ways stricter than the
objective standard. For example, someone who is blind is not required to see
something he cannot; however, he may be required to walk with a cane on
the street, where a sighted person is not so required.60 A person with physical
disabilities is required to take extra precautions to avoid accidents related to
his disability.
In addition to accommodating existing physical disabilities, the law
currently exculpates those actors who cause harm due to sudden,
unforeseeable incapacitation. 61 Often these incidents occur while the actor is
driving a car.62 However, the defendant "has the burden to produce evidence
55 Kelley, supra note 39, at 192 (citing Mahan v. State, 191 A. 575 (Md. 1937) and
Roberts v. Ring, 173 N.W. 437 (Minn. 1919)).
56 Kelley, supra note 39, at 192.
57 Id.
58 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 32, at 175-76; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 11 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
59 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 32, at 176.
60 pESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 11 cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("Physical disability can both advantage and
disadvantage actors at trial .... [It can] advantage the actor at trial by showing that the
actor was unable to adopt a precaution that would be feasible for most persons....
[Conversely, an actor] can be found negligent for not adopting special precautions that
can reasonably reduce the special dangers that the actor's conduct involves.").
61 See id. at § 11(b) (The conduct of an actor during a period of sudden
incapacitation or loss of consciousness resulting from physical illness is negligent "only
if the sudden incapacitation or loss of consciousness was reasonably foreseeable to the
actor."). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 29.
62 See Walker v. Cardwell, 348 So. 2d 1049 (Ala. 1977); Goodrich v. Blair, 646
P.2d 890 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Storjohn v. Fay, 519 N.W.2d 521 (Neb. 1994).
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showing that the incapacitation was unforeseeable. '63 This standard is
similar to that applied to persons with physical disabilities; it is relaxed in
that the unconscious person is not required to be conscious, but it is stricter in
that the person cannot drive a car at all without liability if he is aware of the
likelihood of losing consciousness. 64
Whether a defendant who lost consciousness was aware that he could
lose consciousness is a question for the jury. In Alabama, a defendant was
found not liable after losing consciousness and driving into an oncoming car,
killing a child.65 However, testimony by his father indicated that the
defendant had been having fainting spells for a few years and had even
sought medical attention. 66 Probably because it had been two years since his
last fainting spell, the jury found that the defendant was not aware of the
likelihood of losing consciousness, and the supreme court upheld the
verdict.67
In both the case of physical disability and sudden incapacitation, the law
recognizes that a person should not be held liable for an action or situation
over which he has no control.68 Although he may be required to mitigate
danger related to his disability where he is able, there must be some level of
culpability before a plaintiff can recover.
D. No Exception for Persons with Mental Illness
The defense of mental illness began just as the defenses of infancy and
physical disability did-unavailable in any circumstances. 69 In 1616, the
British courts held that a defendant was liable for damages unless the
incident "be judged utterly without his fault.' '70 However, in dicta, the court
noted that "if a lunatick hurt a man, he shall be answerable." 71
Tort law developed into a fault-based system, requiring courts to
determine, whether an actor was in some way morally culpable for the
63 Cooke v. Grigg, 478 S.E.2d 663, 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
64 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 32, at 175-76; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 11 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
65 Walker, 348 So. 2d at 1050.
66 Id. at 1051.
67 Id.
68 Anita Bernstein, The Communities that Make Standards of Care Possible, 77
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 735, 747-48 (2002) ("[A] court will make an allowance for infirmity
[and] reject the unfairness of holding actors to rigors they are 'incapable' of meeting.").
See also Korrell, supra note 24.
6 9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
70 Weaver v. Ward, (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284, 284 (K.B.).
71 Id.
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outcome; at this time, the more subjective standards for children and adults
with physical disabilities developed.72 In 1849, a treatise was published
arguing that holding the mentally ill liable was like holding a defendant
liable for an inevitable accident. 73 In fact, at the time that the subjective
standard for children was being developed, articles were published
discussing .the irrationality of an objective standard of liability that did not
distinguish children and mentally ill adults.74
The Restatement (First) of Torts included a statement opening up the
possibility of developing an alternate standard for defendants with mental
illness, stating "[u]nless the actor is a child or an insane person, the standard
of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a
reasonable man under like circumstances. ' '75 However, in the comments, it
explicitly states that, although there was a separate standard for children, the
Restatement took no position regarding whether the reasonable person
standard should apply to "insane persons. '76 Ultimately, the subjective
reasonable person standard for mentally ill persons was never considered or
used in the courts.
The dicta from Weaver v. Ward, pronounced in 1616 when tort law was
still governed by strict liability, has been cited as the existing rule for
mentally ill defendants through the present day.77 Courts continue to follow
the precedent of disregarding a defendant's mental illness in determining
liability, even in the face of modem tort law's emphasis on fault and the
development of subjective standards for children and adults with physical
disabilities. 78 Ultimately, in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the rule was
72 Kelley, supra note 39, at 181-82.
73 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, OR, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOvERN THE AMOUNT OF PECUNIARY
COMPENSATION AWARDED BY COURTS OF JUSTICE 456 (2d ed. 1852) ("In the case of the
lunatic it may be urged, both that no good policy requires the interposition of the law, and
that the act belongs to the class of cases which may well be termed inevitable
accidents.").
74 Kelley, supra note 39, at 193-95. See John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for
Tortious Acts: Its History-Ill, 7 HARv. L. REV. 441, 446-48 (1894); Ames, supra note
13, at 99-101; Francis H. Bolen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23
MICH. L. REv. 9 (1925).
75 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 283 (1934) (emphasis added).
76 Id.
77 See Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 470 n.6 (Conn. 1988); Anicet v. Gant, 580
So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Vosnos v. Perry, 357 N.E.2d 614, 615 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1976); Jankee v. Clark, 612 N.W.2d 297, 312 (Wis. 2000).
78 Korrell, supra note 24, at 13 ("In spite of its crudity, the rule that mentally
disabled adults are liable is currently so entrenched in case law that modem courts often
apply the rule without discussion of its rationales."); Vosnos, 357 N.E.2d at 615
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updated to explicitly exclude the exception for mentally ill persons to reflect
the insistence of courts that the objective reasonable person standard apply to
mentally ill persons as it does to other adults.79
Although there is still strict liability with regards to mentally ill
defendants, the law has shifted to allow mental illness as a defense to
contributory negligence. 80 The majority of jurisdictions take the plaintiffs
mental competence into account when determining contributory
negligence. 81 Allowing a defense for contributory negligence parallels the
development of subjective standards for children and for persons with
physical disabilities, indicating that perhaps the common law is moving
towards allowing a subjective standard for defendants with mental illness as
well. 82 However, the proposed Restatement rejects this trend, which may
suggest an impending shift toward strict liability even in the contributory
negligence or comparative negligence context.83 Such a shift would indicate
("However justly this doctrine may have been originally subject to criticism, on the
grounds of reason and principle, it is now too firmly supported by the weight of authority
to be disturbed.") (citing McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (I11. 1887)).
The assumption inherent in the strict adherence to a rule based purely on precedent is
that the common law requires it. However, the development of subjective reasonable
person standards for children and persons with physical disabilities clearly disproves this
requirement. In fact, Prosser explains the common law system as "a rule once laid down
is to be followed until the courts find good reason to depart from it." KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 10, § 3, at 16 (emphasis added). There is no exception to courts' ability to
depart from precedent for a rule "too firmly supported by the weight of authority" or
"entrenched in case law." Id. In fact, Prosser further states that a court should overrule
precedent when warranted. Id.
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965).
80Noel v. McCaig, 258 P.2d 234, 241 (Kan. 1953) ("Since knowledge and
appreciation of the peril are essential elements of contributory negligence, it is obvious
that an inquiry into the age, experience, and mental capacity of the plaintiff is material
where contributory negligence is invoked as a defense.") (citation omitted). See also
Ragle v. Beverly Enters. Inc., 198 F.3d 251 (8th Cir. 1999) (table decision; opinion
available at 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29246, a *3).
81 Stephanie I. Splane, Note, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions,
93 YALE L.J. 153, 157 (1983).
82 See supra notes 41-42, 55-57.
83 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 11 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("The shift in tort doctrine from contributory
negligence as a full defense to comparative responsibility as a partial defense weakens
whatever arguments that otherwise might favor a dual standard that would treat the
mentally disabled plaintiff more leniently than the mentally disabled defendant.").
However, if a plaintiff is unable to comprehend the nature of his actions, it should be
factored into his proportion of fault rather than ignored, to avoid the same unfair
preclusion of damages as in a contributory negligence jurisdiction.
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backward movement in the fair treatment of those defendants without moral
culpability for their actions.
Distinguishing between the subjective standard of liability for children
and the objective standard for adults in some circumstances is nonsensical.
The subjective standard for children takes into account their intelligence and
maturity. 84 As a result, if a person has severe developmental disabilities and
has the capacity of a six-year-old child, that person will be judged as if he
were six, even if he is defending a charge at seventeen. However, if an
accident occurred one day later after his eighteenth birthday, that same
defendant will have liability determined as if he were an adult of average
intelligence. The legal ramifications for having severe developmental
disabilities shift dramatically based only on physical age to no logical end.
In addition, advances in the study of brain chemistry and mental illness
have changed our understanding of the causes of mental illness. It is well
documented that mental illness such as schizophrenia is caused by
differences in brain chemistry.85 Because the symptoms of mental illness,
such as hallucinations and delusions, are a result of physical abnormalities,
the line between physical and mental illness is blurry. As a result, it becomes
more difficult to hold, for example, that epilepsy is a defense to negligence,
but schizophrenia is not.86 The cause of both is physical disease of the brain,
yet the law treats them differently.
V. PURPOSES OF TORT LAW AND POLICY REASONS FOR THE.
REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD FOR MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
Two primary goals of tort law are "to minimize dangerous conduct and
to provide compensation for those that suffer damages. ' 87 In addition, our
system of torts is a fault-based system, requiring liability only when the actor
has acted below the standard of a reasonably prudent person, therefore
84 See supra note 51.
85 RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREET 19 (1990).
86 Hammontree v. Jenner, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Vinci v.
Heimbach, Nos. 73440, 73464, 1998 WL 895381, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1998).
87 Baldwin v. City of Omaha, 607 N.W.2d 841, 850 (Neb. 1965). See also KEETON
ET AL., supra note 10, § 4, at 20, 25. Often these goals come into conflict with one
another. There is a split in tort scholarship between those who see tort liability as
primarily a means of deterrence and those who believe tort liability is a means of
compensating the plaintiff. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming
Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1801, 1801 (1997).
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showing some moral culpability.88 The courts also take into account
administrative efficiency and social policy in deciding tort liability.89
Courts that follow the precedent of strict liability for mentally ill
defendants have cited a number of policy arguments, each addressing a goal
or other factor involved in determining liability.90 As has been discussed in a
variety of articles, the standard arguments for retaining a strict liability
standard for mentally ill tort defendants do not hold weight.91 In fact, there
have only been two articles in modem times written in support of the current
state of the law.92 The existing policy reasons for holding mentally ill
defendants to an objective reasonable person standard do not align with the
goals and policies of our tort system.
A. Compensation
The goal of compensating the injured party accounts for the majority of
arguments for strict liability for mentally ill persons. For example, courts
88 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 4, at 21-23; Baldwin, 607 N.W.2d at 850-51
("These two goals, however, are held in check in a fault-based regime by the equally
important aim of shifting the burden of an injury only if the one to whom the loss is to be
shifted was at fault.... In determining liability, our fault-based regime considers not only
a deviation from an established standard of conduct but also a plaintiffs or defendant's
ability to comply with that standard.").
89 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 4, at 23-24.
90 Korrell, supra note 24, at 28.
91 See, e.g., Okianer Christian Dark, Tort Liability and the "Unquiet Mind": A
Proposal to Incorporate Mental Disabilities into the Standard of Care, 30 T. MARSHALL
L. REV. 169, 180-86 (2004); John V. Jacobi, Fakers, Nuts, and Federalism: Common
Law in the Shadow of the ADA, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 110-14 (1999); Korrell, supra
note 24, at 26-45; Grant H. Morris, Requiring Sound Judgments of Unsound Minds: Tort
Liability and the Limits of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 47 SMU L. REV. 1837, 1841-43
(1994).
92 Morris, supra note 91, at 1839 (citing Splane, supra note 81; George J. Alexander
& Thomas S. Szasz, Mental Illness as an Excuse for Civil Wrongs, 43 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 24 (1967)). The Alexander article is based on "labeling theory," which was a
movement during the middle of the twentieth century stating that mental illness was not
real. Labeling theory proposed that all actions were deviant only by social forces that
labeled them deviant. Because at that time mental illness was understood only in terms of
behavioral symptoms, those subscribing to labeling theory believed that defining
behaviors as mentally ill was merely a way for society to label and therefore control
different groups of people. The behaviors were not inherently indicative of illness, but
merely labeled that way, which in turn defined a person as mentally ill. PAUL S.
APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE
4-7 (1994). With the current understanding of the physical causes of mental illness,
labeling theory is no longer seriously considered. Id. The theoretical basis of the
Alexander article is therefore no longer relevant.
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have held that between two innocent people, the one who caused the injury
and is mentally ill should bear the burden. 93 Further, courts have argued
directly that the purpose of holding mentally ill defendants to a strict liability
standard is to compensate the victim. 94
These are the same arguments used when the rule was established in the
1616 case Weaver v. Ward.95 However, compensation is only part of the
story since the development of our fault-based tort system. Although it is true
that victims should be compensated, it is also true that in the case of an
accident where a jury finds that the defendant acted reasonably, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff.96 In the same vein, when a defendant acts as is
reasonable for his disability or illness, liability for harm should not be placed
arbitrarily in the lap of the actor with the illness. Such a fault-based standard
is the basis of our tort law.
Courts have also argued that between two innocents, where one is a child
at fault, the burden should remain with the injured party.97 There is no clear
reason why this standard is applied to children and not the mentally ill.98 A
93 Vosnos v. Perry, 357 N.E.2d 614, 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Kuhn v. Zabotsky, 224
N.E.2d 137, 141 (Ohio 1967); Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 624
(Wis. 1970).
94 See Delahanty v. Hinkley, 799 F.Supp. 184, 186 (D.D.C. 1992) ("The primary
purpose of such a rule is to compensate the victims for their loss."); see also Goff v.
Taylor, 708 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965)
("[I]f mental defectives are to live in the world they should pay for the damage they
do.").
95 (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.).
96 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 32, at 174-75.
97 See Deluca v. Bowden, 329 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 1975). The court states that
children are not responsible for their actions until they understand that those actions may
injure others. Indeed, the court chose "a rule which holds that members of society must
accept the damage done by very young children to be no more subject to legal action than
some force of nature or act of God." Id. at 111. The finding shows that courts are capable
of adjusting the reasonable person standard to effectively implement our fault-based
system of torts. See also Camerlinck v. Thomas, 312 N.W.2d 260 (Neb. 1981).
98 Prosser suggests in his discussion of the subjective reasonable person standard for
children that "there is a sufficient basis of community experience, on the part of those
who have been children or dealt with them, to permit the jury to apply a special
standard." KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 32, at 179. This is likely the unstated
underlying cause of the discrepancy in standards between children and mentally ill
defendants. Members of society and the legal community have first-hand experience with
both being a child and being around children. However, most people do not have first-
hand experience with severe mental illness within their community. It is extremely rare to
find a member of the legal community who has experienced severe mental illness. As a




defendant experiencing psychosis may be equally or less capable of
understanding reality than a child.99 However, the courts still insist on
unfairly burdening mentally ill adults with liability when they cannot control
their illness or its effects. This burden runs counter to our fault-based system
of tort.
B. Deterrence
In addition to compensation, courts hold defendants liable to deter others
from acting with similar negligence.' 00 Tort law often frames deterrence in
terms of incentivizing efficiency, or limiting the risk that an actor takes to a
socially acceptable level.
Holding a mentally ill person liable for damages he may have caused due
to his psychosis will not deter future similar action.101 If a person is not
aware of what is real and what is not, requiring him to pay for injury he does
not understand will not shape his actions in the future, especially if he
continues to be psychotic. 10 2 Further, a mentally ill actor is unlikely to
consider the pecuniary effect of his actions, even if others have been held
liable for the same negligent acts in the past. 10 3 For example, a defendant
was found liable for damage done while driving recklessly after she escaped
from a psychiatric hospital. 10 4 The court found that the defendant "did not
have the required mental capacity to realize the risk involved to herself and
others."'1 5 By stating that the defendant did not understand that her actions
99 See generally DSM-IV, supra note 3, at 297-302 (defining psychosis as including
delusions, or "erroneous beliefs that usually involve a misinterpretation of perceptions or
experiences," and hallucinations); CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE BIOLOGY OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 47-53 (1992) [hereinafter MENTAL DISORDERS].
100 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 4, at 25 ("When the decisions of the courts
become known, and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a
strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm.").
101 Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the
Mentally Ill, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 67, 89 (1995) ("[O]nly the mentally ill
who have control over their actions can be deterred. When mental illness is sudden or
nontreatable, deterrence is impossible."). In addition, when treatment is not available,
deterrence is also impossible.
102 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 4, at 25 (stating that one reason for promoting
liability is to incentivize people to avoid that harm). However, if a person does not
understand the harm he is causing, that purpose of liability no longer applies. MENTAL
DISORDERS, supra note 99.
103 MENTAL DISORDERS, supra note 99.
104 Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 165-66 (Colo. 1961).
105 Id. at 166.
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could have been harmful, the court itself found that the defendant could not
have been deterred.
However, if a person with mental illness negligently stops taking his
medication, he would still be considered liable under a subjective standard.
Similar standards exist for defendants with physical disabilities and
defendants limited by sudden incapacitation, which are both existing
subjective standards. 10 6 In both cases, should an actor put himself in a
situation which he knows is dangerous as a result of his illness or disability,
he would be liable.
In Eleason v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., the defendant was sued for
wrongful death when he struck plaintiff with his car while having a
seizure. 10 7 The court held that because plaintiff knew he had epilepsy and
such a seizure was foreseeable, he was negligent for driving at all.10 8 The
reasoning would apply in a case where a mentally ill defendant discontinued
his medication without medical advice; he would be found negligent even
under the subjective standard used for people with physical disabilities.
Courts have also argued that holding a mentally ill defendant liable will
deter negligent behavior by a mentally ill actor's caretaker, incentivizing the
caretaker to ensure that the actor is not causing injury. 10 9 However, the
argument has little weight because the current law does not punish the
caretaker; it punishes the defendant. To effectively deter the caretaker from
allowing a person in his care to act negligently, courts should make the
caretaker of the mentally ill defendant directly liable." 0
In addition, the premise of the argument is that the caretaker has control
over the actions of the individual. This is unlikely the case, as caretakers of
adults with mental illness cannot watch over them twenty-four hours a
day. I" If a caretaker could only escape liability by having full control of the
mentally ill actor, the incentive to the caretaker is to totally confine the actor.
As a result, the deterrent effect on the caretaker based on the strict liability of
mentally ill actors, if it exists at all, only incentivizes the families of those
with mental illness to institutionalize those individuals. Finally, such a theory
of negligence ignores the large percentage of seriously mentally ill people
without caretakers.
106 See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
107 35 N.W.2d 301, 302 (1948).
108 Id. at 303 ("[B]ecause the injury might have been avoided by prudence and
foresight it cannot be considered an act of God.").
109 Schumann v. Crofoot, 602 P.2d 298, 301 (Or. 1979); Breunig v. Am. Family Ins.
Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Wis. 1970).
110 Dark, supra note 91, at 183-84; Kelley, supra note 39, at 206.
111 See Sarah Light, Rejecting the Logic of Confinement: Care Relationships and the




Although not a primary goal of tort law, administrability strongly
impacts how courts make decisions.1 12 Even if a legal rule may be the most
just, if it requires more resources, such as time and money, than the case
allows, it will not be effective. Administrability arguments may be the most
commonly cited reasons for maintaining an objective reasonable person
standard for those who are mentally ill.1 13 Courts have argued that it is
impossible to determine whether a defendant is actually mentally ill or
merely using bad judgment. 14 In addition, courts have cited concern that
defendants will falsely claim insanity to avoid liability, for their
negligence. 115
Administrability arguments are unpersuasive for two reasons. First, not
only is legal insanity effectively determined in the criminal context, but it is
currently being used in the context of contract law, probate, health care, and
family law. 116 In addition, mental illness is determined in tort cases where
plaintiffs are defending contributory negligence." 17 The movement of states
towards accounting for mental competence in determining contributory
negligence not only shows that it impacts fault, but also that administrability
concerns are less persuasive.
Second, psychiatry is more advanced today than during the initial
development of tort law. Effectively identifying defendants with a mental
illness that impairs their capacity for understanding negligent action is an
existing and effective part of the justice system. In fact, states have created
detailed manuals providing processes for determining the mental status of
defendants.11 8 The courts should not unjustly place the burden of injury on a
defendant who is not at fault to save resources. The resources required are
112 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 4, at 23-24.
113 Korrell, supra note 24, at 34-40 (discussing the "Burden on the Courts"
rationale).
114 E.g., Kuhn v. Zabotsky, 224 N.E.2d 137, 140 (Ohio 1967).
115 Vosnos v. Perry, 357 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Jankee v. Clark, 612
N.W.2d 297, 316 (Wis. 2000) (finding that courts must "[hold] the mentally disabled
accountable for their torts to prevent defendants from simulating or pretending insanity to
defend their wrongful acts") (citation omitted); Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173
N.W.2d 619, 624 (Wis. 1970).
116 See supra note 24. See also Korrell, supra note 24, at 35.
117 See Jankee, 612 N.W.2d at 29; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 11 cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
118 H. Patrick Furman, The Definition and Determination of Insanity in Colorado,
21 COLO. LAW. 693 (1992).
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currently accessible to courts, as evidenced by the wide variety of settings in
which mental competency is used.
In addition, recent studies have shown that tests have a very high rate of
effectively distinguishing those offenders who have mental incapacity from
those who do not.1 19 In fact, a New York court, in using a plaintiff's mental
capacity to determine his contributory negligence, specifically stated that "it
is possible and practical to evaluate the degrees of' mental acuity and
correlate them with legal responsibility."'120 The court's assertion of the
appropriateness and success of determining mental incapacity has been cited
in other jurisdictions.121 If the scientific community is confident that mental
capacity can be effectively measured, and courts have found that mental
capacity can- be effectively measured specifically in the tort context, then
courts can effectively measure defendants' mental capacities to determine
whether imposing liability is fair under our current fault-based system of tort.
D. Public Policy
Public policy arguments have recently become more integral to tort
decisions. 122 The most significant and facially persuasive argument raised for
retaining an objective reasonable person standard for mentally ill defendants
is in support of the deinstitutionalization movement. 123 This argument has
only appeared recently, as the movement against long-term
institutionalization of mentally ill persons began in the middle of the last
century. 12 4
In addition, the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts disregards
standard policy arguments, most likely because they are unpersuasive for the
119 Jill S. Hayes, David B. Hale & William Drew Gouvier, Malingering Detection in
a Mentally Retarded Forensic Population, 5 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOL. 33 (1998)
(explaining that a battery of four psychological tests correctly identified mentally
retarded members of a group from those pretending to be mentally retarded to escape
prosecution); Richard Rogers, J. Roy Gillis & R. Michael Bagby, The SIRS as a Measure
of Malingering: A Validation Study with a Correctional Sample, 8 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 85,
89 (1990) (finding 88% of those tested with a new scale successfully identified as
malingering or clinical in the correctional population; rate would be higher using further
techniques).
120 Mochen v. New York, 352 N.Y.S.2d 290, 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
121 Cowan v. Doering, 522 A.2d 444, 449 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Miller
v. Trinity Medical Center, 260 N.W.2d 4, 7 (N.D. 1977).
122 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 3, at 15 ("[I]t is only in recent decades that
[public policy's] influence on tort law has been openly considered in judicial decisions.").
123 See Korrell, supra note 24, at 40-42 (discussing the "For Their Own Good"
rationale); see also Dark, supra note 91, at 185-86.
124 See Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 664-65 (Ind. 2000).
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reasons already stated. The authors of the proposed Restatement have
emphasized the argument that if a person with severe mental illness is to live
in the community, then he should be held to the same standard as others in
the community. 125 In this way, "deinstitutionalization becomes more socially
acceptable if innocent victims are at least assured of opportunity for
compensation when they suffer injury. '"126
The policy argument in favor of holding mentally ill persons liable
because they need to be accepted into society is unpersuasive. 127 Most
importantly, the standard is illogical considering the subjective reasonable
person standard available to people with physical disabilities and children. 128
Certainly the courts would not require children to be institutionalized until
they can be held to the same reasonable person standard as an adult. Such a
standard would also be discriminatory towards people with physical
disabilities. 129
In addition, with the current understanding of psychiatry, the line
between physical and mental illness is increasingly blurry. 130 The Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires the same protections for individuals
with mental disabilities as it does for individuals with physical disabilities. 131
Congress specifically endorsed the parity of treatment of those with physical
and mental disabilities in the ADA when it defined disability as "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual."' 132 Therefore, holding an individual liable for
125 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 11 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
126 Id.
127 See, e.g., Dark, supra note 91, at 185-86; Jacobi, supra note 91, at 99-104;
Kelley, supra note 39, at 205; Korrell, supra note 24, at 40-41.
128 Goldstein, supra note 101, at 85-87; Jacobi, supra note 91, at 100-05; Kelley,
supra note 39, at 203-04.
129 The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) ("Subject to the
provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.").
If the government, or public agencies, required people with physical disabilities to be
held to the same standard of reasonable action as able-bodied people, there would be
clear discrimination, even if based only on the resulting lack of accessibility as required
in 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
130 See Korrell, supra note 24, at 14.
131 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000).
132 Id.
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his disability, especially to further a goal of limiting access to public
activities, is in conflict with the spirit of the ADA. 133
The assumption inherent in the proposed Restatement's argument is that
deinstitutionalization is the cause of dangerous mentally ill people being set
loose. This is a misunderstanding and an oversimplification of the current
situation of mental health systems. 134 The purpose of deinstitutionalization is
to serve people with mental illness effectively in the community on an
outpatient basis. However, effective treatment is not being provided in the
community for those with very serious mental illness. 135 By protecting the
larger community from the affects of mental illness, the courts are
camouflaging the true culprit-an underfunded and underperforming mental
health system. The community needs to be aware of the de-compensating
state of the country's mental health system in order to correct it.
Until the Warren Court began its tenure protecting individual liberties,
the legal standard for involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons had
been the same since the Civil War. At that time, if institutionalization could
be helpful to a person with mental illness, the court allowed that person to be
institutionalized involuntarily. 136 In 1972, in the case Lessard v. Schmidt, a
three-judge district court panel interpreted Wisconsin's vague statute
regulating involuntary commitment to include "a balancing test in which the
state must bear the burden of proving that there is an extreme likelihood that
if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or
others."' 37 The new test, which gained acceptance throughout the country,
required dangerousness to self or others before a person could be committed.
133 See Jacobi, supra note 91, at 125-54.
134 See Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A
Story of Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REv. 63, 80-94 (1991). The movement of people
with serious mental illness from institutions into the community was prompted not just by
humanitarian concerns regarding the state of those institutions, but also by financial
concerns with the cost of maintaining so many beds. Id. at 84. In addition, the process of
integrating previously institutionalized individuals into the community was meant to
include a network of services that ultimately failed to materialize. Id. at 84 n. 129.
135 Id.
136 APPELBAUM, supra note 92, at 20; Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093
(E.D. Wis. 1972) ("[T]he court may order a patient involuntarily committed if it is
'satisfied that he is mentally ill or infirm or deficient and that he is a proper subject for
custody and treatment."') (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.02(5)).
At that time, asylums granted care to those whose family requested services, and
who were "in need of or likely to benefit from services." Over the next century, a process
was developed similar to the process of the criminal justice system. In addition, like a
pendulum, the ease with which mentally ill persons could be involuntarily committed
swung back and forth. APPELBAUM, supra note 92, at 20-2 1.
137 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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The new dangerousness requirement was purportedly necessary to protect the
liberty of people with mental illness. The authors of the proposed
Restatement are focusing on deinstitutionalization as a result of the
movement for individual rights and treating those mentally ill defendants as
if they need to defend their freedom. However, the legal protections are
likely not the reason that people with severe mental illness are not currently
being served in psychiatric hospitals. 138
The negative impact of deinstitutionalization, as well as
deinstitutionalization itself, is largely a result of inadequate funding. 139
During the 1960s, states began to rapidly close psychiatric hospitals, in part
to save money. 140 But the plan to send mentally ill patients into a community
with services available to support them was and still is severely under-
funded. 141 As a result, approximately 2.2 million people with severe mental
illness do not receive treatment. 142 The unintended outcome has been an
138 APPELBAUM, supra note 92, at 35-41. A survey of studies, both aggregate and
case studies, found only a few jurisdictions showing a change in the number of
commitments or makeup of the committed population from the status quo before a state
passed a stricter, dangerousness-based law to after. Id.
One particular study observed the commitment process after the implementation of
California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which was passed to tighten the requirements
for involuntary commitment. The Act stated that, to be committed initially, the person
must "as a result of a mental disorder, [be] a danger to others, or to himself, or gravely
disabled." Carol A. B. Warren, Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The
Application of California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 629, 630
(1977). The findings indicated that the passage of the new commitment criteria did not
change who the court was committing, merely how the outcome was labeled. The study
found that, by and large, defense attorneys, psychiatrists, and judges were most
concerned with what was best for the client rather than the letter of the statute. Id
139 See Dark, supra note 91, at 185-86; DAVID MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH AND
SOCIAL POLICY: THE EMERGENCE OF MANAGED CARE (1969); APPELBAUM, supra note
92, at 50 (finding that the rapid reduction in inpatient population in the mid-1960s was a
combination of "the opinions of community psychiatrists who disliked institutionalization
and the underfunding of state facilities by penurious legislators."). The opinions of
community psychiatrists referred to included those in the school of labeling theory,
discussed supra note 92.
140 APPELBAUM, supra note 92, at 50.
141 See NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR MENTAL ILLNESS, GRADING THE STATES: A
REPORT ON AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 10 (2006),
available at http://www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/GradingtheStates/
Full Report/GTS06_final.pdf ("'Deinstitutionalization' ... was the result of better
medications and a better understanding that the best outcomes for individuals with
serious mental illnesses occurred when they remained 'connected' to home communities.
The failure of that transition was the result of a failure to invest adequately in community
services.").
142 TORREY, supra note 19, at 10.
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increase in homelessness and a rise in the number of mentally ill people in
prisons. 143 This policy set forth by case law and the proposed Restatement
rests on the assumptions that people are not in mental health facilities
because that -is their informed choice, and that they would have full access to
treatment if they sought it. Both assumptions are implicit in the belief that
incentives are all that is needed to provide an inpatient or effective outpatient
setting for people with severe mental illness. Not only do many mentally ill
individuals in the community suffer for lack of access to care, but the rules of
tort provide almost no actual incentives. 144 As a result, the incentives
provided by the existing law are not effective in decreasing "negligent"
behavior. '
The proposed Restatement claims that:
if a person is suffering from a mental disorder so serious as to make it likely
that the person will engage in substandard conduct that threatens the safety
of others, there can be doubts as to whether the person should be allowed to
engage in the normal range of society's activities. 145
There have been a variety of articles asserting that requiring people with
severe mental illness to be institutionalized to avoid liability is
inappropriate.1 46 However, the argument need not even go that far. If
everyone who was so seriously mentally ill as to engage in conduct that
might be a liability to others chose to be treated in an inpatient setting, space
would allow only a small percentage of those people to be served. 147 The
143 Perlin, supra note 134, at 98; George B. Palmero, Maurice B. Smith & Frank J.
Liska, Jails Versus Mental Hospitals: A Social Dilemma, 35 INT'L J. OF OFFENDER
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 97, 103 (1991) ("The authors believe that the statistical
evidence derived from the national census data corroborates their clinical observation that
jails have become a repository of pseudo-offenders-the mentally ill."). See also
TORREY, supra note 19, at 13-42.
144 See supra Part IV.B.
145 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILrrY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 11 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
146 Dark, supra note 91, at 185-86; Goldstein, supra note 101, at 87; Korrell, supra
note 24, at 34.
147 See TORREY, supra note 19, at 8-9 ("[A]pproximately 92 percent of the people
who would have been living in public psychiatric hospitals in 1955 were not living there
in 1994 .... [A]pproximately 763,391 severely mentally ill people ... are living in the
community today who would have been hospitalized 40 years ago.").
The focus of scholarship should not be whether or not people's "freedom" is being
curtailed in the sense of whether they are committed to a hospital, but whether there is the
opportunity to be effectively served. In fact, if a person is so ill that he is acting in a
hazardous way, chances are he may not be able to effectively care for himself or make
logical decisions. In that case, freedom to decide for oneself can only be achieved with
effective treatment. By receiving either inpatient or outpatient treatment, a person may
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policy that the Restatement sets forth-protection for innocent people from
people with serious mental illness living in the community-should not
punish those who have no control over their actions. Rather, as a community,
we should encourage our mental health systems to take more responsibility
for treating those in need, either through inpatient treatment or outpatient
treatment, depending on the needs of the person.
Finally, by asserting that the public needs protection from those with
mental illness and requiring strict liability from defendants with mental
illness, the proposed Restatement perpetuates the stereotype that people with
mental illness are dangerous. 148 Although people with physical disabilities
may be more prone to accident in some sense, society and the courts have
logically required them to take precautions based on their limitations, but not
to act as if they were not disabled. By not allowing the same
accommodations for people with mental illness, the court is validating the
significant stigma associated with mental illness.
V. TOWARDS A REASONABLE "REASONABLE PERSON" STANDARD FOR
MENTALLY ILL DEFENDANTS
To effectively account for an actor's mental illness, a workable standard
must be developed for determining its impact on the actor's liability.
Suggestions have been made such as the "reasonably prudent insane person"
standard, 149 categorizing mental illness by its physical origin to include it in
the physical disability standard, 150 and categorizing the act of an incompetent
defender as equivalent to an act of God.' 51 All of these tests have their pros
and cons; the goal is to find a fair solution that is usable by the courts.
The Model Penal Code provides a standard for determining mental
disease or defect for purposes of criminal defense. Section 4.01 states:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
regain control of his thoughts and make decisions for himself with his wise mind. See
Dora W. Klein, Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally Ill: Autonomy Is Asking the Wrong
Question, 27 VT. L. REV. 649, 660 (2003).
148 See Edwin V. Valdiserri, Kenneth R. Carroll & Alan J. Hartl, A Study of Offenses
Committed by Psychotic Inmates in a County Jail, 37 HOsP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
163 (1986) ("[T]he increased number of mentally ill prison inmates does not reflect a
greater incidence of serious criminal activity.").
149 Jacobi, supra note 91, at 115-25.
150 Dark, supra note 91, at 205-09.
151 Ague, Jr., supra note 13, at 227.
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(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct. 152
This provision may be easily adjusted to fit a negligence action. In addition,
it meets an appropriate standard for culpability, which takes into account
which facts are beyond the control of the actor.
In a negligence action, the court would first determine whether the actor
lacks substantial capacity to either appreciate the dangerousness or
negligence of his conduct. As discussed above, an important basis of the
reasonable person standard is that varying degrees of intelligence or
thoughtlessness that may affect a person's ability to appreciate dangerousness
will not be considered. However, the Model Penal Code language "lacks
substantial capacity" indicates a more substantive delineation between a
defendant with and without a mental disability. 153 The test requires that the
mental illness of the defendant be such that he is incapacitated from making
rational decisions. Therefore, if the defendant were unable to understand the
reality of a situation, he would not be held liable.
For example, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held a defendant liable for
an automobile accident caused when she accelerated into a truck because she
believed that she could fly.15 4 It is obvious from the defendant's actions, as
well as the expert testimony provided by her psychiatrist, that she lacked
substantial capacity. By way of comparison, someone who may be a poor
driver would perhaps drive too quickly, not pay attention, or not have much
experience driving so as to have slow reflexes that may cause an accident.
Such an accident may be caused by failure to see the truck, accidental use of
the gas instead of the break, or other inadvertent action while driving.
However, these are mere differences in ability rather than the lack of capacity
to understand the reality of a situation.
Alternatively, if a defendant is unable to act as a reasonable person, or
"conform his conduct to the requirements of law," 155 he would not be held
liable in tort. The Model Penal Code standard does not ask whether the
defendant would find it difficult, or even extremely difficult, to act as a
reasonable person. Like the standard for physical illness, this portion of the
test asks whether the actor "has the capacity' 156 at all. As a result, mere
differences of ability will not be a factor, preserving the objective reasonable
person standard in the vast majority of cases.
152 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2005).
153 Id.
154 Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Wis. 1970).




Subsection 2 of the Model Penal Code standard creates an exception to
the mental deficiency defense for people with antisocial personality disorder.
Although people with antisocial personality disorder are mentally ill and
have a limited capacity to act with others in mind, this particular disorder
will not be considered a defense. 157 As a result, people who are inherently
dangerous, without the cognitive distortions present in a psychotic disorder,
will not have the affirmative defense of mental. disease or defect available.
Although the Model Penal Code provides a rule the courts can use to
determine whether a person with mental illness should be liable for his
negligence, there is still ,the concern of future dangerousness of the
defendant. A woman who accelerates into the back of a truck is likely not
safe to send home in her car. To continue with the comparison to criminal
law, the consequence of finding a criminal defendant not guilty by reason of
insanity is usually involuntary commitment. 158 Although there is no such
precedent in civil actions, finding a defendant not liable due to his mental
illness should result in involuntary commitment, or at the very least a
commitment hearing.
The Supreme Court has held that -the standard for involuntary
commitment is whether the person is a danger to himself or others. 15 9 If a
person is so ill as to be considered unable to understand the consequences of
negligence, there is significant proof that he is a danger to himself or others.
Indeed, if a defendant has been found negligent, but for his affirmative
defense, that is per se proof of dangerousness. As a result, the logical
outcome of finding a defendant not liable based solely on his mental illness is
157 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual defines antisocial personality disorder as
having three of the following traits: unlawful behavior, deceitfulness, impulsivity,
irritability and aggressiveness (getting into fights), reckless disregard for safety,
consistent irresponsibility (cannot hold a job), or lack of remorse. DSM-IV, supra note 3,
at 706.
158 21 AM. JuR. 2D Criminal Lasw § 79 (2007) ("Depending on the law of the
jurisdiction and the facts of the particular case, a person who has been acquitted of a
charge of crime by reason of insanity may be unconditionally discharged, conditionally
released, or involuntarily committed for hospitalization. Some statutes provide for the
automatic and immediate involuntary commitment of an insanity acquittee .... ").
159 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409-10 (2002) ("We have consistently upheld
such involuntary commitment statutes when (1) the confinement takes place pursuant to
proper procedures and evidentiary standards, (2) there is a finding of dangerousness
either to one's self or to others, and (3) proof of dangerousness is coupled ... with the
proof of some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality."'
(citations omitted)).
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inpatient treatment. As in criminal cases, the defendant would be discharged
at the suggestion of the treating psychiatrist. 160
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Restatement generally is to summarize the current
state of the law. However, the proposed Restatement blames the lack of an
affirmative defense for mentally ill tort defendants on a strained
understanding of deinstitutionalization. In addition, the proposed
Restatement suggests that the courts move backward and discount a defense
of mental illness in contributory and comparative negligence as well. A fairer
result, in keeping with our fault-based system of tort, would be to temper the
objective reasonable person standard with ,a test for mental capacity to
determine liability. By treating mental illness as a disability, similar to any
physical disability or illness, the courts can help erode the stigma of mental
illness.
160 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992) ("We held, however, that '[t]he
committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer
dangerous,' i.e., the acquittee may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and
dangerous, but no longer.") (citations omitted).
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